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ABSTRACT
The potential gains to producers from the cartelization of the world
petroleum, copper, and bauxite markets are calculated under the
assumption of optimal dynamic monopoly pricing of an exhaustible
resource. Small quantitative models for the markets for each resource
are developed that account for short-term lag adjustments in demand
and supply as well as long-term resource depletion. Potential gains
from the cartelization of each resource are measured by calculating
optimal price trajectories under competition and under cartelization,
and comparing the sums of discounted profits resulting from each.
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GAINS TO PRODUCERS FROM THE CARTELIZATION OF EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES
1. Introduction
It has been suggested that one reason for OPEC's formation and later success
in maintaining itself as a cohesive cartel is that the gains from cartelization
in the world oil market are so large. Indeed, looking at the historical success
record of various cartels (or attempts at cartelization), a case could be made
that those cartels were most successful for which potential monopoly profits were
1the greatest. After all, there are significant costs associated with cartelization -
political costs, costs of coordination of output and price, and, for each producer,
costs associated with the risk of being undercut and losing significant short-term
profits. Bearing these costs would not be worthwile if the expected resulting
gains were not at least as large. It is therefore important to know what the
potential gains from cartelization are.
Often the analysis of producer gains from cartelization is based on a simple
static computation of the potential monopoly profit in a particular market, given
elasticity estimates for demand and for supply from those producers who would not
be likely to join the cartel. Such a static analysis might be realistic and quite
sufficient for such markets as bananas, coffee, and sugar, where demand and supply
can adjust quickly to price, and where resource exhaustion is not a determinant of
or constraint on production. A static analysis might be misleading, however, for
1An historical summary of the experience of some international cartels is given
in Eckbo [ 8].
2such markets as petroleum, copper, or bauxite. First, the process of reserve
depletion for these resources might have an important impact on monopoly pricing
decisions and on the potential gains from cartelization. Second, the markets for
these resources are characterized by demands and supplies that adjust only slowly
to changes in price, so that a cartel might have the potential for large short-
term monopoly profits by taking advantage of adjustment lags.
The problem of measuring the potential gain from the cartelization of a
particular exhaustible resource can be put quite simply. Given reserve levels
and the dynamic structure of demand and cost, and given that the objective of
each producer is to maximize the sum over time of discounted profits, what
are the optimal price trajectories under competition and under cartelization,
and how much larger is the sum of discounted profits as a result of cartelization?
We of course assume that the (potential) cartel in question is able to behave
as a perfect monopolist that knows the structure of demand and cost. In addition,
we do not address the issue of how the gains from cartelization are to be
divided up among the cartel members.
To measure these potential gains we must turn to the theory of how an exhaus-
tible resource is optimally priced over time. It was Hotelling [15] who first
demonstrated that under competition price minus marginal cost should rise at the
rate of discount, while in a monopolistic market rents (marginal revenue minus
marginal cost) should rise at the rate of discount.2 It can be shown that under
conditions of constant demand elasticity and zero extraction costs, the price
2For another derivation and interpretation of Hotelling's results, see Herfindahl
[12] and Gordon DJ ]. For further discussion, see Solow 22] and Banks [ 1 ]. Note
that Hotelling's results are based on the assumption of constant extraction costs.
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trajectories will be the same in both the monopoly and competitive cases. How-
ever, if extraction costs are positive and/or the elasticity of demand is rising,
the monopoly price will initially be higher (and later be lower) than the compe-
titive price, ie. the monopolist will be relatively "conservationist."4
The relevant question, however, is to what degree will the price trajec-
tories in the two cases differ? Stiglitz [23] claims that in general "there
is a very limited scope for the monopolist to exercise his monopoly power."
This may be the case for some exhaustible resources, but not for others. It
will depend in part on the particular way in which demand elasticities change
and production costs increase as the resource reserve base is depleted. It
will also depend on the ability of the monopolist to take advantage of adjust-
ment lags in the demand for his output.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to calculate optimal monopolistic
and competitive price trajectories for several exhaustible resource cartels, and
thereby determine the potential gains to producers from cartelization. Our
model of cartelization is rather simple; we treat the cartel as a pure mono-
polist holding a known quantity of reserves and facing a "net demand" function
(total world demand minus supply from "competitive fringe" producers who are not
members of the cartel). We ignore such potential problems as differences in
production costs for different members, differences in objectives, need for output
5
rationalization, etc. The approximate analysis is still useful, however, since if
the gains to the pure monopolist are not large, we would not expect the more
-
3A nice demonstration of this is given by Stiglitz [z3].
4This is examined by Stiglitz [23] and Sweeney [24].
5The effects of these problems on pricing and output policy for OPEC is examined
in Hnyilicza and Pindyck 13].
4"realistic" cartel to remain stable over a long period of time, while if the
gains are quite large, there should be sufficient incentive for the producers
to overcome the problems typical of cartelization.
We limit ourselves here to three cartels that have already identified them-
selves as politically (if not economically) feasible realities. In particular,
we consider OPEC in the case of petroleum, CIPEC (International Council of Copper
Exporting Countries) in the case of copper, and IBA (International Bauxite Associa-
tion) in the case of bauxite. It is clear that OPEC has already demonstrated its
ability to enjoy large monopoly profits, and here we shall calculate the
potential profits that it might enjoy in the future. The argument has been
made, however, that OPEC is an exception to the rule, and that CIPEC, IBA, and
other real or imagined natural resource cartels do not have the potential for
any significant monopoly profits. Here we explore this argument quantitatively.
In the next section we present the basic optimal pricing model for an exhaust-
ible resource cartel facing a dynamic "net demand" function, and explain how
optimal price trajectories for both the monopoly and competitive cases can be
obtained. Then, the basic model is applied to OPEC and the world oil market, and
it is used to calculate optimal price trajectories for OPEC and measure OPEC's
potential monopoly gains. Next we turn to the bauxite and copper markets, fitting
the basic model to each in an attempt to measure the potential gains that IBA and
CIPEC might realize by following optimal pricing rules. We conclude with some
remarks about actual and potential cartel behavior.
6See, for example, Krasner [17] and Smart [21]. For opposing views see Bergsten
[3 , 4 and Mikdashi [19].
52. An Optimal Pricing Model for an Exhaustible Resource
The basic model is specified to account for differences between short-run
and long-run price elasticities both in demand and supply from "competitive fringe"
7
countries. Total demand (TD) for the resource in question would be of the form
TDt f ( t't'TDt-) 1)
where Pt is real price and Yt is a measure of aggregate income or product. This
specification of the demand function would take into account the substitution of
other materials for this resource (e.g. coal for oil or aluminum for copper),
since we assume that the prices of competing materials are fixed, they need
not be included explicitly in (1).
Net demand facing the cartel is
Dt = TD - S (2)t t t
where St is the supply function for the "competitive fringe," and is given by
St = f2(P tStl).
Resource depletion might be as significant a factor for the competitive fringe
as it is for the cartel, in which case we can modify the supply function so that
it moves to the left (rising marginal and average cost) in response to cumulative
production CS:
S =f ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(3')St = f2(Pt'st-l).(1/1 + a) Ct/ (3)
with ~ -s +with CSt = CSt_1 + St (4)t-l t
and S is average annual competitive production and a is a parameter that
determines the rate of depletion.
7Our approach is similar to that of Cremer and Weitzman [ 7] and Kalymon L61, who
have also recently constructed optimal pricing models for OPEC. Those studies,
however, do not account for adjustment lags. Non-optimizing simulation models of
OPEC behavior have also been constructed; see, for example, Blitzer et al. by.
6
An accounting identity is needed to keep track of cartel reserves, R:
Rt = Rt 1 - D . (5)
The objective of the cartel is to pick a price trajectory {Pt} that will
maximize the sum of discounted profits:
N
MaxW = (1/(+6) t)[P -m/Rt]Dt (6)
t=l t t
where m/Rt is average (and marginal) production costs (so that the parameter
tn determines initial average costs), 6 is the discount rate, and N is chosen
8to be large enough to approximate the infinite-horizon problem. Note that
average costs become infinite as the reserve base Rt approaches zero, so that
9the resource exhaustion constraint need not be introduced explicitly. As a
result, we have a classical, unconstrained discrete-time optimal control
problem, so that numerical solutions can be obtained easily.1 0
8An N of forty years usually provides a close enough approximation 
- the
resulting W is within lOX of the infinite horizon W.
.. .. . . _..................... 
_.. _._. .. . .................................................. 
. ......... 
9 A constraint on the production capacity of the cartel can be introduced
implicitly by rewriting the objective function as:
N bDc
MaxW = (1/(l+6)t) [P - m/R - ae t D (6')
t-l t t t
where c is large enough so that the added expression is close to zero when
Dt is ust below the capacity constraint and very large when Dt is Just above.
Typically, c equal to 20 or 30 (with a and b chosen appropriately) will do the
job. In the applications of this model that follow, however, the capacity
constraint is never even approached (i.e. it is always optimal for the cartel
to produce at below capacity), so that (6') need not be used.
~~... 
.... ........
10 We use a general nonlinear optimal control algorithm developed by E. Hnyilicza
[1I]1 . Using that algorithm, optimal pricing policies can be derived in a
classical control theoretic framework for any model in implicit state-variable
form:
&(at-ls Pt-l' Atl-) 0
where is a vector of nonlinear functions in the set of state variables xt
(endogenous and lagged endogenous variables, together with state variables
defined for P and elements of z occuring with lags longer than one period),
the price (control) variable Pt, and a set of exogenous variables zt. The
objective function can also be general in form.
7The solution to the above problem yields an optimal price trajectory
{P;} and optimal sum of discounted profits W for the monopolist. We wouldt.
like to compare these with the optimal price trajectory and sum of discounted
profits that would result if the cartel dissolved (or never formed), and its
member producers behaved competitively. We say "optimal" because competitive
producers must still manage an exhaustible resource, balancing profits this
year against profits in future years.
Although competitive producers cannot collectively set price, they each
determine output given a price. We show in the Appendix that the rate of output
should be such that the competitive price satisfies the difference equation
Pt (1+6)P t-1 - dm/R- 1 (7)
If this were not the case, larger profits could be obtained by shifting output
from one period to another. In addition, the initial price must be such that
two constraints hold. First, the resulting price and output trajectories {Pt }
and {D;} must both satisfy, at every point in time, net demand as given by
equations (1), (2), and (3), i.e. supply and demand must be in market equilibrium.
Second, as the price rises monotonically over time, resource exhaustion must
occur at the same time that net demand goes to zero.1 1 If demand becomes zero
before exhaustion occurs some of the resource is wasted and yields no profits;
profits would be greater if the resource were depleted more rapidly (at a lower
price). If exhaustion occurs before demand becomes zero, depletion is occuring
too rapdily and should proceed more slowly.1 2
lWe are assuming here that the net demand curve indeed intersects the vertical
axis. If this were not the case, price would rise indefinitely with demand
asymptotically approaching zero and exhaustion occuring at t - .
1 2Note that if the autonomous rate of growth in net demand is greater than the
discount rate 6, the optimal price will be such that output is always infini-
tesimally small, since then it always pays to postpone all production into
the future.
8The computation of the optimal price trajectory for the competitive case
is thus straightforward. Pick an initial P and simulate (i.e. solve over
time) equation (7) together with equations (1), (2), (3), and (5). Repeat
this for different values of P0 until Dt and Rt become zero simultaneously.
3. Petroleum - The Gains to OPEC
The basic model described above is parameterized for the world oil market so
that it is consistent with the reserve, production, and elasticity estimates of
the OECD [o], and with crude elasticity estimates obtained from aggregate time
series data. The equations of the model are as follows:
TDt 1.0 - .13Pt + .87TDt 1 + 2.3 (1.0 1 5)t (8)t ~~t t-l
-C /7St = (1.1 + .10oPt)'(1.02) CSt/7 + .75St 1 (9)t 1
Cst =CSt_ + S (10)t-l t
Dt =TD - St (11)
Rt R_ D (12)t-1 t
N 1
MaxW = I (1+6) [Pt-250/Rt]Dt (13)
t~l
where TDt total demand for oil (billions of barrels per year)
Dt = demand for cartel oil (bb/yr)
St = supply of competitive fringe (bb/yr)
CSt = cumulative supply of competitive fringe (billions of barrels)
Rt = reserves of cartel (billions of barrels).
Pt = price of oil ($ per barrel) in constant 1975 dollars.
9The demand equation (8y is based on a total demand of 18 billion barrels
per year at a price of $6 per barrel; at that price the short-run price
elasticity is .04 and the long-run elasticity is .33 (with a Koyck adjustment),
while at a $12 price the short-run and long-run elasticities are .09 and .90
respectively. The last term in equation (8) provides an autonomous rate of
growth in demand of 1.5% per year, corresponding to a long-run income elasticity
of 0.5 and a 3% real rate of growth in income.
At a $6 price competitive supply is about 6.5 billion barrels per year.
The supply equation (9) implies short-run and long-run elasticities of .09 and
.35 respectively at the $6 price, and .16 and .52 respectively at a $12 price.
Depletion of competitive fringe reserves pushes the supply function to the
left over time. After a cumulative production of 210 billion barrels (e.g.
7 bb/yr. for 30 years) supply would fall (assuming a fixed price) to 55 of
13
its original value. 3
Note that the average cost of production for the OPEC cartel rises
hyperbolically as Rt goes to zero. The initial reserve level is taken to
be 500 billion barrels, and initial average cost is 50¢ per barrel} 4
13Note that there is no fixed upper bound on cumulative production by competitive
fringe countries; there is always some price at which additional supplies would
be forthcoming. For example, after 210 billion barrels have been produced, a
price of $18.5 would be needed to maintain production at 6.5 bb/yr, whlle ftr
420 billion barrels have been produced a $43 price would be needed to maintain
the 6.5 bb/yr. production level.
14500 billion barrels represents a rough estimate of proved reserves for OPEC
(Source: Oil and Gas Journal, December 1975). Potential reserves would be greater,
but we assume that the more conservative number would be used by OPEC to plan a
long-term price policy.
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In calculating optimal price policies we take as initial conditions
TD0 = 18.0, S0 = 6.5, and CS0 = 0. Price trajectories are calculated over
a forty-year horizon, with discount rates of .05 and .1015 Optimal prices
for both the monopolistic and competitive cases are shown graphically for
the first 25 years in Figure 1, and prices, total demand, OPEC production,
OPEC reserves and discounted profits are shown for the longer horizon in
Table 1. Finally, for each discount rate the ratio of the monopoly price to
the competitive price is shown graphically in Figure 2, and the ratio of
monopoly to competitive discounted profits is shown in Figure 3.
Observe that the optimal monopoly price is $13 to $14 in the first year
(1975), declines over the next five years to around $10, and then rises slowly.
This price pattern is a characteristic result of incorporating adjustment lags
in OPEC's net demand fundtion. If total demand and competitive supply had been
modelled as static functions of price, the optimal monopoly price, like the
competitive price, would rise monotonically. With adjustment lags, however,
it is optimal for OPEC to charge a higher price initially, taking advantage of
the fact that net demand can adjust only slowly. Of course in the competitive
case price will still rise monotonically, even with adjustment lags, since the
competitors cannot together restrict output to take advantage of the initially
inelastic demand.
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
15With a discount rate of .02 or less the initial competitive price is over $10.
With autonomous growth in net demand (resulting from autonomous growth in total
demand and depletion of competitive fringe reserves) the optimal production rate
will approach zero if the discount rate is small enough. Pre-OPEC oil prices
were never in the vicinity of $10, which means that competitive producers either
used higher discount rates or else used a low discount rate but produced at a
very sub-optimal rate. The presence of risk (regarding potential reserves, changes
in market conditions, etc.) would make it most reasonable to use a discount rate of
.05 or higher, and so we use .05 and .10.
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Observe also that with the smaller discount rate the initial competitive
price is higher. With a large discount rate producers pay less attention to the
future, so that their output decisions more closely approximate those that would
be made without accounting for resource depletion, i.e. they more closely approxi-
mate the static competitive solution. When the discount rate is low producers
must be more "conservationist," so that initial output levels are reduced and
prices are closer to those that would be set by a monopolist. As can be seen
in the results, resource exhaustion by competitive producers occurs earlier at
the higher discount rate, since prices begin low and then rise more rapidly in
later years when the discount rate is large. The competitive solution - as given
by equation (7) - is such that a lower discount rate, implying a lower rate of
increase in price, will restrict initial output so that initial price is higher
and closer to the monopoly price. With a 10% discount rate the competitive price
is $1.55 in the first year, which is in the vicinity of actual pre-OPEC Persian
Gulf prices. Thus we could assume that prior to OPEC, producers either set output
levels dynamically using a high discount rate - or else (as is more likely) simply
ignored the problem of depletion.
The relative gains from cartelization are summarized in Table 2. Note
that these gains are largest during the first five years, particularly when
the discount rate is large, since it is during this period that a monopoly can
take advantage of adjustment lags and reap large short-term profits. Even over
the longer term, however, the sum of discounted profits is 502 to 100% larger
under cartelization. The incentive for maintaining the cartel is thus considerable.
Obviously these results are dependent on the particular model and parameter
values described earlier. However, changing the model's parameters has only a
small effect on the numerical results. For example, if the elasticities (short-
12
and long-term) of total demand are doubled, optimal monopoly and competitive
prices decrease by less than 20%. Doubling the elasticity of competitive supply
results in a decrease in price of about 10%. Replacing the total demand and
competitive supply equations with isoelastic equations (using the $6 elasticities
from the linear equations) results in price trajectories that are at all times
within 15%iof those reported in Table 1.16 Doubling or halving OPEC's initial
average production cost has less than a 5% effect on monopoly price and less
than a 20% effect on competitive price. None of the aforementioned changes affects
the ratios of sums of discounted profits reported in Table 2 by more than 10%. The
gains to OPEC from cartelization are thus high under a broad range of assumptions.
Changing the initial level of OPEC reserves from 500 billion barrels to 800
billion barrels (but increasing m, so that initial average cost is still 50¢) has
almost no effect (less than 10%) on the optimal monopolistic price trajectories,
but it does have a significant effect on the competitive solutions. Using the
higher reserve estimate, initial competitive prices for 6 = .05 and .10 are
$3.06 and $0.65 respectively. These prices are lower because there is less
need to conserve (exhaustion occurs after 43 years at the high discount rate
and 54 years at the low rate, as compared to 33 years and 44 years in Table 1),
so that prices are closer to those that would result from competitors making
static output decisions (i.e. setting output one period at a time, ignoring
future periods). Since competitive prices and discounted profits are lower, the
use of a higher initial reserve estimate means greater potential gains from
cartelization (NPVm/NPV is 2.42 for 6 .05 and 3.05 for 6 = .10). The 800
c
billion barrel figure represents proven reserves plus "highly likely" potential
reserve:3, and thus might be a more realistic number to use in setting price or
output over time. We chose the 500 billion barrel figure in part because it
better dramatizes the effects of depletion on price and output dynamics.
1 6Note that net demand for OPEC oil will not be isoelastic.
13
Table 1 - Petroleum
Monopoly: 6 = .05
P TD D R I
1975 13.24 17.24 9.94 488.5 126.5
1976 11.19 16.88 9.23 478.6 93.8
1977 10.26 16.72 8.94 469.3 78.9
1978 9.90 16.66 8.87 460.4 71.7
1979 9.82 16.66 8.91 451.5 67.9
1L980 9.88 16.69 9.00 442.6 65.7
1L985 10.84 16.96 9.67 396.3 60.6
]L990 11.98 17.32 10.40 346.5 56.3
1L995 13.18 17.74 11.15 293.0 51.8
2000 14.46 18.22 11.91 235.7 47.1
2005 15.92 18.75 12.66 174.6 42.5
2010 20.29 18.67 12.55 110.5 41.0
Monopoly: 6 = .10
P TD D R d
1975 14.08 17.13 9.75 488.5 132.3
1.976 11.75 16.71 8.94 478.8 91.2
1L977 10.70 16.52 8.61 469.8 72.4
1L978 10.28 16.44 8.52 461.2 62.3
1.979 10.19 16.42 8.54 452.7 56.2
1980 10.26 16.43 8.61 444.1 51.8
1 985 11.28 16.62 9.21 399 9 37.8
1.990 12.51 16.90 9.87 352.6 27.9
].995 13.80 17.24 10.53 301.9 20.3
2000 15.18 17.63 11.20 248.0 14.6
2005 16.72 18.06 11f6 190.7 10.5
2010 20.52 18.05 11.S&* 130.5 7.9
billions of dollars
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Table 1 - Petroleum
Competitive: 6 = .05
P TD D R Id
:L975 4.62 18.36 11.92 488.5 46.64
1L976 4.85 18.68 12.29 476.6 48.22
1L977 5.09 18.96 12.62 464.3 49.62
:L978 5.35 19.20 12.90 451.7 50.90
1L979 5.62 19.42 13.14 438.8 52.00
:L980 5.90 19.60 13.35 425.6 52.92
1L985 7.53 20.19 13.99 357.3 55.87
:1990 9.60 20.30 14.04 287.1 56.15
1L995 12.26 19.96 13.55 217.6 54.04
2000 15.65 19.13 12.48 151.8 49.15
2005 19.97 17.69 10.71 92.6 40.76
2010 25.48 15.46 8.07 44.0 27.59
(depletion occurs in 2019)
Competitive: 6 = .10
P TD D R Hd
1975 1.55 18.76 12.63 488.5 11.92
1L976 1.71 19.43 13.59 475.9 13.31
1977 1.88 20.03 14.40 462.3 14.49
:L978 2.06 20.56 15.10 447.9 15.49
1979 2.27 21.04 15.70 432.8 16.50
1980 2.50 21.46 16.20 417.1 17.38
1L985 4.02 22.87 17.74 332.4 20.32
1990 6.47 23.29 17.93 242.8 21.23
1995 10.43 22.64 16.74 154.9 19.94
2000 16.79 20.49 13.65 76.5 15.49
2005 27.05 15.98 7.72 18.7 5.50
2010 (depletion occurs in 2008)
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Table 2 - Petroleum: Relative Profits
(Ratio of NPV for monopolist to NPV for competitors)
NPV n (1975 until exhaustion or 2015)
6 .05 : NPVm/NPV = 2092A362 = 1.54
6 = .10 : NPVm/NPVC = 1078/ 556 = 1.94,~~~~~~ 
NPV = Ed (first five years)
6 .05 : NPV /NPV = 438.8/247.4 = 1.77
m c
6 = .10 : NPV /NPV = 414.4/ 71.7 = 5.78
m c
Figure 1 - Optimal Oil Price Trajectories
(M - monopoly, C competition)
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Figure 2 - Ratio of Monopoly to Competitive Prices
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Figure 3 - Ratio of Monopoly to Competitive Discounted Profits
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4. Bauxite - The Gains to IBA1 7
There are no published econometric studies of the world bauxite market
that can be tapped for elasticity estimates, and therefore our competitive
supply equation must be somewhat speculative. A total demand equation,
however, can be derived from the demand for aluminum and from cost data on
the production of alumina from bauxite and from alternative aluminum-bearing
ores. Data on costs, reserves, and production is available from the U.S.
Bureau of Mines [25,27]. The equations of the model are listed below:
TDt [1.048 - .131P + 13.1(1.03)t] e- (0641Pt) 1 0+ tTD= . + .80TDt1 (14)
St (-1.69 + .4225Pt) (1.005os)-CSt/17+ .90St 1 (15)
CSt = Cst_l
+ St (16)
-Cs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(16)
Dt = TDt - St (17)
Rt Rt_-1 Dt (18)
N
N 1 [P. - 5 5'00 0 D (9)
tMl (1+6) t [Pt Rt JDt
where
TDt total demand for bauxite (millions of metric tons per year)
St = supply from competitive, fringe (mmt/yr)
CSt= cumulative supply of competitive fringe (mt)
Dt = net demand for IBA bauxite (mt/yr)
Rt = reserves of cartel (mnt)
Pt = price of bauxite ($/mt) in constant 1973 dollars.
17
IBA countries include Australia, Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, Guinea, Yugoslavia,
and Sierra Leone, and in 1974 accounted for 74% of non-Communist world bauxite
production.
18
For a range of prices up to about $15.60 the demand for bauxite is quite
inelastic, but at higher prices it becomes economical to produce alumina
from sources other than bauxite, so that the demand for bauxite becomes almost
18
infinitely elastic.8 In the inelastic region the demand for bauxite depends
on the demand for aluminum. At a bauxite price of $8 per ton, bauxite itself
represents about 8% of the cost of producing aluminum. Using short- and long-
run price elasticities of aluminum demand of -.2 and -1.0 respectively, the
corresponding price elasticities for bauxite would be -.016 and -.08. The
income elasticities should be the same as those for aluminum; we use 0.2 and
t
1.0 for the short-run and long-run respectively. The term (1.03) in equation
(14) builds in the assumption of 3 annual real growth in income.
At a price of around $15.60 we would expect the demand for bauxite to fall
rapidly to zero. For this reason the exponential erm is included in equation
(14). By choosing a large enough exponent for .06 41Pt = P/15.60, we cant
achieve an arbitrarily close approximation to a piecewise linear demand
function. In fact we would expect demand to start falling off at prices
somewhere below $15.60 (if for no other reason than anticipation of future price
increases), and demand to be small but not zero at higher prices, so we choese
10 as the exponent. The long-run demand function is plotted in igure 4 .
180ther sources of alumina (A1203) include high-alumina clays, dawsonite, alumite,
and anorthosite, all of which are in great abundance in the earth's crust. The
most economical alternative to bauxite is to produce alumina from high-alumina
clays using the hydrochloric acid - ion exchange process. In this process there
is an operating cost of $74.5 per ton, of which $5.02 is the cost of clay at
$1 per ton. In addition the fixed capital cost of a 1000 ton per day plant is
$108 million. Assuming a 102 cost of capital and 350 operating days per year,
and ignoring replacement costs, and/or maintenance, capital cost becomes $30.85
per ton of alumina, so that the total cost of producing alumina through this process
is $105 per ton. Producing alumina from bauxite using the Bayer process would not
be this expensive unless the price of bauxite rose to $15.60 per ton. At that price
operating costs would be $86 per ton, of which $40 would be the cost of bauxite (abou
2.5 tons of bauxite for every ton of alumina). The cost of a 1000 ton per day plant
is $66 million, so that the capital cost is $19 per ton, for a total cost of $105 per
ton. (All prices in 1973 dollars.) Source of data: U.S. Bureau of Mines 26].
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The supply function for the competitive fringe is straightforward and
is given by equation (15). At a price of $8 the short-run and long-run
elasticities are 0.2 and 2.0 respectively. Since there is considerable
uncertainty as to what the true long-run elasticity is, we must examine the
sensitivity of our results to these parameter values. Bauxite is quite
abundant; reserves for the competitive fringe can sustain production for
nearly 300 years at current levels. Our competitive fringe supply function
moves to the left only slowly as cumulative production increase - after a
cumulative productive of 1700 million tons (e.g. 17 mt/yr for 100 years),
supply would fall to 61% of its original value.
Equation (19) is the objective function for IBA. Initial reserves are
11,000 mmt(225 years of production at current levels),and initial production
costs are $5 per ton. Initial conditions for the other variables are TD0= 65.5,
S = 16.9, and CS0 - 0.
Optimal monopoly and competitive price trajectories are again calculated for
discount rates of .05 and .10, but this time over an eighty-year horizon, since
proven reserves are large. Optimal price trajectories are shown graphically in
Figure 5, and prices, total demand, IBA production, IBA reserves, and discounted
profits are presented n Table 3. The ratio of the monopoly price to the compe-
titive price is shown graphically in Figure 6, and the ratio of monopoly to
competitive discounted profits is shown in Figure 7.
Observe that the optimal monopoly price has the typical characteristic of
dropping for about five years and then rising slowly. The price fluctuates,
however, over a small range, and at all times ttithin a few dollars of the
"limit price" at which production of alumina from other ores becomes economical.
The initial competitive price is again higher for the lower discount rate, but
21
the difference in the initial percentage mark-ups above average cost for the
two discount rates is much smaller, and the mark-ups themselves are mubh lower,
19than was the use for petroleum.9 This is because the reserve base for bauxite
is large (depletion in the competitive case takes at least 75 years) so that
there is little incentive for competitive producers to withhold production in
earlier years. In both the monopoly and competitive cases depletion plays
only a small role in the determination of price during the first thirty years.
Monopoly pricing is essentially "limit pricing" for a produced good; except
for the effects of lag adjustments during the first five years, price can almost
be chosen at the profit-maximizing "limit" each period, ignoring future periods.
The relative gains from cartelization are summarized in Table 4. Again
the relative gains are largest during the first five years, and are dependent
on the discount rate. For either discount rate, however, the relative gains
ard larger than was the case for petroleum. Over the long term, cartelization
of bauxite markets results in 60% to 500% increase in the sum of discounted
profits. This should be sufficient incentive for maintenance of the International
Bauxite Association.
Because of the "limit pricing" characteristic of the monopoly solution,
our results are not very sensitive to the elasticity assumptions that were used.
Doubling the long-run elasticity of supply (which is the parameter about which
we are most uncertain) results in optimal monopoly and competitive price tra-
jectories that are always within 10% of the numbers reported in Table 3.
It should be pointed out that IBA is currently selling bauxite at close to
what we have calculated to be the optimal monopoly price. In 1973 dollars, bauxite
is now elling in the range of $12 to $14. According to our calculations, the
cartel should roughly maintain this price (in real terms) over the next twenty
to thirty years.
1 9For bauxite (Po-ACo)/AC is 0.28 for 6 = .05 and 0.09 for 6 = .10 in the
0competitive case. For petroleum the corresponding numbers are 8.06 and 2.04.
competitive case. For petroleum the corresponding numbers are 8.06 and 2.04.
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Table 3 - Bauxite
Monopoly: 6 = .05
P TD D R d
1975 13.03 62.9 43.9 10,956 352.1
1976 12.79 61.6 40.8 10,915 302.9
1977 12.62 61.0 38.8 10,876 267.0
1978 12.49 61.2 37.7 10,839 240.9
1979 12.40 61.7 37.2 10,801 223.4
1980 12.34 62.7 37.2 10,764 210.4
1985 12.37 70.2 41.7 10,567 183.5
1990 12.56 80.0 50.1 10,334 174.3
1995 12.79 91.1 60.5 10,053 167.0
2000 13.03 103.3 72.6 9,715 158.1
2005 13.27 116.6 86.1 9,312 146.6
2010 13.53 130.6 100.4 8,839 133.0
2015 13.82 144.8 114.9 8,293 117.3
2020 14.14 157.9 128.4 7,677 98.6
2025 14.50 168.0 138.8 7,002 80.4
2030 14.92 172.1 143.2 6,291 60.4
2035 15.38 167.4 138.6 5,585 41.0
2040 15.82 153.6 124.9 4,930 24.4
2045 16.20 134.9 106.4 4,360 12.5
Monopoly: 6 = .10
P TD D R 
1975 13.09 62.8 43.8 10,956 321.7
1976 12.84 61.4 40.6 10,915 288.3
1977 12.65 60.9 38.6 10,877 242.8
1978 12.52 61.0 37.5 10,839 210.2
1979 12.42 61.6 37.0 10,803 185.2
1980 12.36 62.5 37.0 10,766 166.1
1985 12.35 70.2 41.7 10,569 114.9
1990 12.51 80.2 50.3 10,335 86.6
1995 12.71 91.7 61.3 10,052 66.0
2000 12.91 104.5 74.0 9,708 49.5
2005 13.12 118.7 88.5 9,295 36.5
2010 13.34 134.1 104.3 8,806 26.3
2015 13.59 150.2 120.8 8,235 18.4
2020 13.90 165.8 136.9 7,582 12.5
2025 14.28 178.6 150.0 6,857 8.0
2030 14.76 184.1 155.7 6,085 4.7
2035 15.32 176.4 148.0 5,324 2.4
2040 15.94 152.2 123.6 4,650 1.0
2045 16.46 118.1 90.1 4,133 0.4
millions of dollarsillions of dollars
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Table 3 -(Cont.)
Competitive: 6 = .05
P TD D R d
1975 6.43 65.7 49.5 10,950 70.3
1976 6.50 66.3 50.6 10,900 71.3
1977 6.58 67.1 51.9 10,848 71.4
1978 6.65 68.2 53.4 10,795 71.7
1979 6.73 69.4 55.1 10,740 72.9
1980 6.81 70.9 56.8 10,683 73.9
1985 7.27 80.1 66.7 10,370 80.5
1990 7.80 91.9 78.2 10,002 86.5
1995 8.42 105.9 91.1 9,573 92.0
2000 9.15 122.1 105.8 9,075 96.7
2005 9.98 140.5 122.2 8,497 99.2
2010 10.92 160.7 140.2 7,832 99.8
2015 11.96 181.1 158.2 7,077 94.1
2020 13.07 196.7 171.1 6,243 81.1
2025 14.18 198.0 169.9 5,383 58.7
2030 15.20 176.6 146.1 4,596 32.3
2035 16.00 138.1 105.9 3,983 12.5
2040 16.51 101.2 67.8 3,572 3.2
2045 16.76 78.6 44.8 3,309 0.2
(depletion occurs in 2066)
Competitive: 6 = .10
P TD D R d
1975 5.45 65.8 50.0 10,950 22.0
1976 5.50 66.5 51.6 10,898 21.3
1977 5.54 67.4 5a.4 10,845 20.7
1978 5.59 68.6 55.3 10,790 20.5
1979 5.64 69.9 57.3 10,732 20.2
1980 5.70 71.4 59.4 10,673 20.2
1985 6.02 80.9 70.6 10,343 19.1
1990 6.42 92.8 83.0 9,953 17.8
1995 6.94 106.9 96.7 9,497 16.5
2000 7.62 123.4 112.0 8,969 15.4
2005 8.48 142.3 129.1 8,358 14.1
2010 9.58 163.8 148.1 7,656 12.6
2015 10.97 187.1 168.1 6,805 10.7
2020 12.66 205.7 182.8 5,836 8.1
2025 14.61 194.9 167.5 4,877 4.8
2030 16.75 129.5 97.3 4,205 1.9
2035 19.38 52.6 15.2 3,817 0.2
2040 (net demand becomes zero in 2038*)
2045
The optimal initial competitive price is somewhere between $5.44 and $5.45; at that
price net demand would become zero at exactly the point that depletion occured. The
$5*45 initial price is our closest approximation to the true optimal, and because
it is slightly higher than the true optimal net demand becomes zero before depletion
occurs. This approximation has almost no effect. however. on the aim nf A4rn-,,A
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Table 4 - Bauxite: Relative Profits
(Ratio of NPV for monopolist to NPV for competitors)
NPV = Id (1975 until exhaustion or 2050)
= .05 : NPVm/NPV = 7857/4835 = 1.63
m 
6 = .10 : NPVm/NPV = 3904/ 789 = 4.95
m c
NPV I d (first five years)
= .05 : NPVm/NPV = 1386/358 = 3.87
= 10 NPVm/NPV = 1248/105 11896=.10 : NPV /NPVC = 1248/105 = 11.89
Figure 5 - Optimal Bauxite Price Trajectories
(M monopoly, C = prices)
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5. Copper - The Gains to CIPEC2 0
Our model for copper draws heavily from the econometric model of the world
copper market constructed by Fisher, Cootner, and Baily [10], and in fact can
be viewed as an aggregated version of their model. We also draw upon the work
of Banks [2 ], and obtain updated reserve and production data from the U.S.
Bureau of Mines [25,27]. The equations of the model are as follows:
TDt = .405- .78P + .9OTDt 1 + .9 1 (1.0 3)t (20)
-CSP/4
SPt = (-.190 + .8 613Pt)'(1.015) cS P / 4 + .88SPt_1 (21)
CSPt CSPt_ 1 + SPt (22)
SSt/Kt = .00940 + .005733Pt - .37(SStl/Kt_1 ) (23)
Kt = .98Kt_ 1 + TDt -SS t (24)
St SPt + SSt (25)
Dt = TDt - St (26)
Rt = Rtl- Dt (27)
N
Max W = I 220 [Pt R. ]Dt (28)
tl [ t Rt t
where TDt = total demand for copper (millions of metric tons per year);
SPt = primary supply from competitive fringe (mmt/yr);
SSt = secondary supply from scrap ("old" secondary) from competitive
fringe (mmt/yr);
20CIPEC countries include Chile, Peru, Zambia, and Zaire, and in 1974 accounted
for 32% of non-Communist world copper production.
27
CSPt = cumulative primary supply of competitive fringe (mmt);
St = total supply from competitive fringe (mmt/yr);
Kt = stock of copper in product form (mmt);
Rt = reserves of cartel (mmt);
Pt = price of copper ($ per pound) in constant 1975 dollars.
The demand equation (20) explains total demand for refined copper net of
"new" secondary production. 2 1 The reason for excluding "new" secondary produc-
tion will become clear shortly. Corresponding to average figures for 1974,
total demand is 7.3 million metric tons at a price of $.75 per pound.2 At
this price the short-run price elasticity is .16 and the long-run elasticity
is .80. These elasticities correspond to a weighted average (weighted by
consumption levels) of the regional demand elasticities estimated by Fisher,
23 
Cootner, and Bailey. The last term in equation (20) provides an autonomous
rate of growth in demand of 3.75% per year, corresponding to a long-run
24income elasticity of 1.25 and a 3% real rate of growth in income. The
major substiteute for copper is aluminum, but since we assume a fixed price
for aluminum, an aluminum price need not be included explicitly in (20).
21'New" secondary copper is produced from shavings and other wastage that result
in the process of milling copper and producing finished copper products, while
"old" secondary copper is produced from scrap; i.e. from recycled copper products.
2 2We assume that the same price prevails in all regions, and ignore differences
between the U.S. producer price and the London Metal Exchange price. There have
been periods during which the U.S. price was below the LME price, with rationing
by U.S. producers. McNicol [1o] argues that rationing is profitable for partially
integrated producers since it allows them to achieve the effects of price dis-
crimination. The effect is therefore not that of undercutting a world market
price to expand market share, and there would be no impact on the demand for
cartel copper.
23Regional demand (and supply) equations for which price was statistically
insignificant were not included in the average.
24The income elasticity is again an average of the Fisher, Cootner, Baily estimates.
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Primary supply from the competitive fringe is 3.8 mt/yr at a price of
75¢, with short-run and long-run elasticities of .20 and 1.6 respectively.
Thus, although in the long-run supply is quite elastic, the adjustment time
is considerable? 5 Depletion of competitive fringe reserves pushes the primary
supply function to the left over time. After a cumulative production of 160 mmt
(e.g. 4 mt/yr for 40 years), primary supply would fall (assuming a fixed price)
to 55% of its original value.
Secondary supply includes only "old" secondary production, i.e. production
from scrap, and thus depends on the stock of copper products available to be
converted into scrap. We follow Fisher, Cootner, and Baily in using the primary
price rather than the scrap price since the two prices are very highly correlated,
and we apply their elasticity estimates for the U.S. (.43 in the short run and
.31 in the long run) to the rest of the world? 6 The stock of copper products
available for scrap is simply last year's stock, minus losses of 2%, plus
primary production this year; secondary production is not included since it
adds to the stock of products but depletes the stock by the same amount.
As mentioned above, we exclude "new" secondary production from the model.
The shavings and other "wastage" that provide the input to "new" secondary
production come from the milling of copper sheet as well as the later trans-
formation of sheet into a variety of copper products. Thus a good part of
"new" secondary production is just a transformation of the output of-primary
25
Again, this is based on the Fisher, Cootner, Baily estimates. More recent
estimates by Banks [ ] indicate elasticities that are somewhat lower - around
1.0 in the long-run.
2 60utside of the U.S. data for secondary supply is not broken down into "new"
and "old," and the determinants of "new" secondary supply are quite different.
We obtain an estimate of the level of "old" secondary supply by applying the
U.S. ratio of "old" secondary to total secondary outside the U.S. Equation (17)
represents a stock-adjustment model, so that the long-run elasticity is smaller
than the short-run elasticity,
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production, and including it in total demand would involve some double counting.
More important, although almost all secondary production occurs in the consuming
countries, part of the input to "new" secondary production comes from CIPEC
countries, so that including it would result in a misleading understatement of
CIPEC's role in the world market.
The model is completed with equation (28) that specifies the maximization
of the sum of discounted profits. The initial CIPEC proven reserve level is
135 mt, and initial average cost is 50¢ per pound. The multiplication by 2204
is to convert pounds to metric tons.
In calculating optimal price policies we take as initial conditions TD0 = 7.3,
SP 0 = 3.8, SS0 = 1.2, CSP0 = 0, and K0 = 120. These numbers correspond to 1974
data. We use a forty-year horizon in the monopoly case, with discount rates of .05
and .10. Optimal monopoly and competitive prices are shown graphically in Figure 8,
and prices, total demand, competitive supply, CIPEC production, reserves, and
discounted profits are presented in Table 5. Finally, the ratio of the monopoly
price to the competitive price is shown in Figure 9, and the ratio of monopoly to
competitive discounted profits is shown in Figure 10.
We observe that the optimal monopoly price oscillates, and this occurs because
27
of the stock adjustment effect in the secondary supply equation.27 The envelope of
the monopoly price, however, follows the same pattern as the monopoly petroleum
and bauxite prices, dropping during the first several years (after taking advantage
2 7The long-run price elasticity of secondary supply is smaller than the short-run
elasticity. Price is set high in 1975 to take advantage of lag adjustments in
total demand and primary supply, but this results in a large increase in secondary
supply. If the 1975 price were maintained in 1976, secondary supply would fall
because of the stock adjustment, but primary supply would rise further; dropping
the price in 1976 results in a still larger drop in secondary supply.
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Table 5 - Copper
Monopoly: 6 = .05
*
P TD SP SS D R 
1975 1.23 6.92 4.22 1.43 1.28 133.8 2031
1976 .78 6.97 4.19 1.14 1.64 132.2 964
1977 1.02 6.86 4.38 1.50 0.98 131.2 998
1978 .73 6.99 4.29 1.20 1.50 129.7 657
1979 .98 6.95 4.43 1.55 0.97 128.7 801
1980 .75 7.13 4.36 1.28 1.50 127.2 570
1985 1.01 7.67 4.69 1.74 1.25 120.7 762
1990 .97 8.59 5.03 1.78 1.78 112.8 701
1995 1.15 9.64 5.60 2.20 1.85 103.8 768
2000 1.20 10.99 6.20 2.42 2.38 93.0 735
2005 1.36 12.59 6.94 2.90 2.75 80.0 724
2010 1.49 14.47 7.77 3.36 3.34 64.4 590
*
millions of dollars
Monopoly: 6 = .10
P TD SP SS D R 
-~~~~~
1.06
.75
.94
.71
.94
.73
1.02
.89
1.17
1.24
1.38
1.58
7.06
7.11
7.04
7.18
7.16
7.33
-7.85
8.77
9.74
11.00
12. 48
14.18
4.06
4.03
4.17
4.09
4.22
4.15
4.52
4.86
5.52
6.22
7.06
8.07
1.41
1.17
1.44
1.22
1.52
1.28
1.79
1.70
2.27
2.50
2.93
3.48
1.59
1.91
1.42
1.86
1.42
1.90
1.54
2.21
1.94
2.27
2.48
2.62
133.4
131.5
130.1
128.2
126.8
124.9
116.4
106.8
96.9
85.9
74.0
61.0
1962
957
1112
565
876
493
576
301
300
210
147
97
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
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Table 5 (cont.)
Competitive: 6 = .05
P TD SP SS D R 
~d
1975 .79 7.27 3.83 1.23 2.21 132.8 1372
1976 .80 7.26 3.88 1.28 2.10 130.7 1250
1977 .82 7.26 3.93 1.32 2.02 128.7 1193
1978 .83 7.28 3.98 1.36 1.94 126.7 1098
1979 .85 7.32 4.05 1.41 1.87 124.9 1049
1980 .87 7.37 4.12 1.45 1.81 123.1 1005
1985 .95 7.83 4.55 1.67 1.61 114.7 788
1990 1.05 8.56 5.09 1.91 1.56 106.8 691
1995 1.16 9.52 5.74 2.19 1.59 99.0 632
2000 1.29 10.71 6.51 2.53 1.68 90.8 598
2005 1.44 12.14 7.39 2.94 1.81 82.0 569
2010 1.61 13.84 8.40 3.44 2.01 72.4 544
(depletion occurs in 2031)
Competitive: 6 = .10
P TD SP SS D R 
1975 .66 7.37 3.72 1.14 2.51 132.5 833
1976 .68 7.45 3.67 1.22 2.56 129.9 823
1977 .69 7.53 3.63 1.25 2.65 127.3 771
1978 .71 7.63 3.62 1.31 2.70 124.6 750
1979 .73 7.72 3.62 1.35 2.75 121.8 728
1980 .75 7.83 3.64 1.40 2.79 119.0 698
1985 .85 8.45 3.93 1.65 2.87 104.8 502
1990 .96 9.21 4.45 1.93 2.83 90.5 320
1995 1.09 10.16 5.14 2.24 2.78 76.5 189
2000 1.23 11.37 5.88 2.57 2.91 63.4 65
2005 1.34 13.05 6.50 2.89 3.66 50.5 2
2010 1.25 15.08 6.51 2.94 5.63 24.8 0
(depletion occurs in 2014 *)
The optimal initial competitive price is between .66 and .67. The .66 initial price
is our closest approximation to the true optimal, and because it is slightly below
the true optimal, price begins to decline and profits go negative before depletion
occurs. The approximation has almost no effect, however, on the sum of discounted
profits.
32
Table 6 - Copper: Relative Profits
(Ratio of NPV for monopolist to NPV for competitors)
NPV = d (1975 until exhaustion or 2015)
6 = .05 : NPVm/NPV = 28988/26792 = 1.08
m c
6 = .10 : NPVm/NPV = 14772/11278 = 1.31c
NPV - II d (first five years)
6 = .05 : NPV /NPV = 5453/5962 0.91
6 = .10 : s-V~/NPV = 5472/3905 = 1.40
Figure 8-Optimal Copper Price Trajectories
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Figure 9 - Copper: Ratio of Monopoly to Competitive Prices
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of lag adjustments in total demand and secondary supply), and then rising
slowly as depletion of the resource base nears. Again the initial competitive
price is higher for the lower discount rate. Resource exhaustion plays a more
significant role in the determination of copper prices than was the case with
bauxite; using U.S. Bureau of Mines figures for proven reserves, exhaustion in
the competitive case occurs after 56 years at the .05 discount rate and after
39 years at the .10 discount rate.
As can be seen in Table 6, the relative gains from cartelization are not
large. Over the long term, cartelization of copper markets results in only an
8% to 30% increase in the sum of discounted profits. Furthermore, the increased
profits require fluctuations in price (and in profits) that some cartel members
might wish to avoid. It would thus appear that there is little incentive for
closely coordinated pricing and output policies on the part of the CIPEC cartel.
This is consistent with recent history; so far CIPEC countries have not managed
to significantly increase their copper revenues through cartelization.
6. Concluding Remarks
We began this paper by asking whether the owners of exhaustible resources
might accrue significant monopoly profits through cartelization. The answer
would appear to be yes in the cases of petroleum and bauxite, and no in the case
of copper. The reasons for this, however, seem to have little to do with the
fact that the resources are exhaustible, and more to do with market share and
short-term lag adjustments. OPEC and IBA account for around two-thirds of non-
Communist world petroleum and bauxite production, while CIPEC accounts for only
one-third of copper production. Demand and competitive supply of petroleum and
bauxite adjust only slowly to changes in price, while secondary copper supply
responds quickly to price changes.
35
Resource exhaustion does have a significant effect on the pattern of
pricing and output in both the monopoly and competitive cases, and tends to
reduce the percentage increase in profits from cartelization when the discount
rate is low. As competitive producers pay more attention to future depletion,
they tend to restrict present output, raising price closer to the monopoly level.
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APPENDIX
THE COMPETITIVE PRICE TRAJECTORY WITH RISING PRODUCTION COSTS
In this Appendix we show that equation (7) describes the competitive
price trajectory. Assume average cost is a function only of cumulative
output x. Then, in continuous time, the competitive firm chooses output
qt to maximize
=o
TW ' [qtpt e 6t-C(xt)qte -6]dt (A)
with price p taken as given. This is subject to the constraints
=t qt (A.2)
and
Xt 4 R (A.3)t- 0
Using the Maximum Principle, the Hamiltonian is
-6t -6tH = qpe - C(x)qe +Xq (A.4)
and the Lagrangian is
L = H + (R - xt) (A.5)
with 0 and (R - x) 0, so that is zero until exhaustion occurs at time T.
We have
i - C' (x)qe- 6 t +P (A.6)
The optimal production trajectory qt maximizes H, but since H is a linear function
of qt we have a singular problem, so that H is maximized by qt 0 or X (or some
upper limit q), depending on whether pe- 6 t -C(x)e- 6 t + is negative or positive.
X is always negative (as we would expect, since it is the marginal discounted
profit to go resulting from an additional unit of cumulative output) since is
positive and approaches zero as exhaustion nears. Thus the decision to produce
nothing or at the upper limit will depend on the price p. Then the market demand
37
function will ensure that
-6t-tpe - C(x)e- 6 t + I = 0 (A.7)
At the price that satisfies (A.7) producers will ust be indifferent between
producing nothing or everything, so that just enough will be produced to
satisfy market demand. From (A.7) we have
- C'(x)qe- t - 6(x)e-6t + pe 6t - pe t (A.8)
Combining this with (A.6) and rearranging, we get
dp/dt = 6[p-¢(x)] (A.9)
In discrete-time this gives as the difference equation
Pt = (1 + )Pt-1 - C(xt-1) (A.10)
-
It
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